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ABSTRACT
With globalization, securities markets have become increasingly interconnected, and
securities fraud has frequently crossed borders, creating problems for national
regulators seeking to deter and punish fraud. The United States’ well-developed
private enforcement mechanism for securities fraud is very attractive to investors
around the world who are harmed by transnational securities fraud, particularly
those from countries where private enforcement mechanisms do not exist or fraud is
under-regulated. The application of U.S. securities law to foreign investors,
∗
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however, presents a number of challenges, creating the potential for both under and
overregulation as well as possible conflict with the regulatory systems of other
jurisdictions. This Article outlines the current law on extraterritorial application of
the securities antifraud rules, including a number of important recent developments
in the case law. It examines the challenges presented by the increasing globalization
of financial markets, and provides a fresh perspective in the debate on the proper
scope of the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law. Ultimately, this aticle
argues against further judicial limitations on the extraterritorial application of the
securities laws, but urges the development of a multilateral agreement to address the
numerous and significant challenges presented by transnational securities fraud.
I. INTRODUCTION
With globalization, securities markets have become progressively more
interconnected, and securities fraud has increasingly crossed borders, creating
problems for national regulators seeking to deter and punish fraud. The United
States’ well-developed private enforcement mechanism for securities fraud is very
attractive to investors around the world who are harmed by transnational securities
fraud, particularly those from countries where private enforcement mechanisms do
not exist or fraud is under-regulated.1 The application of U.S. securities law to
foreign investors, however, challenges traditional presumptions against
extraterritorial application of the law. Furthermore, broad extraterritorial assertions
of U.S. antifraud rules can have a negative effect on business interests, and can lead
to jurisdictional conflict with other countries.2 Courts hearing claims brought by
foreign investors under U.S. antifraud rules must balance these considerations
against the aims of deterring securities fraud and protecting U.S. markets and
investors. Given the competing normative concerns and the increasingly complex
fact patterns in transnational securities fraud cases, courts have struggled to delineate
the proper scope of the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antifraud rules.
Recent events have shown that, if anything, more rather than less regulation of
securities fraud is necessary. The private enforcement mechanism provided for by
the securities antifraud rules is an important tool in deterring and punishing
transnational securities fraud that has some connection to the United States. This
aticle will argue in favor of a flexible approach to determining the extraterritorial
application of the securities antifraud rules. However, recognizing the valid
concerns regarding jurisdictional conflict and comity considerations raised by a
broad extraterritorial assertion of U.S. regulatory law in this area, this Article urges
countries to seek a multilateral solution to the problems raised by transnational
securities fraud.

1
While the regulatory systems of most countries with a developed securities market
include proscriptions against fraud, there are broad variations in the intensity and methods of
enforcement from one country to another. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The
Impact of Enforcement 4 (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 304, 2007); Howell E. Jackson, Variations in the Intensity of Financial
regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 256
(2007).
2

See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 63-64 (2007).
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In supporting this position, Part I of this Article will provide background on U.S.
securities antifraud rules and the global economy, emphasizing the challenge of
addressing transnational securities fraud with primarily local regulatory tools. Part II
will then set forth the current state of the law regarding the extraterritorial
application of the U.S. securities antifraud provisions. Part III will examine the
Second Circuit’s recent application of the “conduct” test in the noteworthy case of
Morrison v. National Australia Bank.3 It will also point out the problems with the
current approach of courts in determining the extraterritorial reach of the securities
antifraud rules in the context of so called foreign-cubed cases such as Morrison. Part
IV will address possible solutions to these problems. This Article will then conclude
by arguing for a multilateral framework that would enhance cooperation and
establish minimum standards for regulating securities fraud, as well as a
jurisdictional or choice-of-law rule to avoid jurisdictional conflict and unnecessary
overregulation.
II. THE SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD RULES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Federal regulation of securities transactions emerged in the aftermath of the 1929
stock market crash, with the aims of promoting “full and fair disclosure” in the sale
of securities, protecting investors against fraud, and maintaining “fair and honest
markets” for securities transactions.4 The securities laws achieve these goals through
the implementation of a mandatory full disclosure policy under which market
participants are required to reveal certain material information in connection with
offers, sales, and purchases of securities, through proscriptions against fraud, and
through the imposition of civil liabilities for violations of the securities laws and
rules.5
Of course, much has changed in the American and global financial markets since
the 1930s. Companies and investors alike participate in markets outside their own
home base to an extent probably undreamed of at the time these U.S. securities laws
were written. And yet, financial regulation remains largely bound by national
borders, though cooperation between regulators has increased.6 At the same time,
however, fraud in the financial markets is not constricted by national boundaries, as
the recent unmasking of several global financial scandals has shown.7 In addition,
though most developed countries prohibit securities fraud in similar substantive

3

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008).

4

See 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2010); see also Michael J. Calhoun,
Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United
States Jurisdiction, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 679, 682 (1999).
5

See Calhoun, supra note 4, at 683.

6

See, e.g., Catrin Griffiths, SEC Beefs Up Cross-Border Cooperation in Blitz on Fraud,
THE LAWYER, Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.thelawyer.com/sec-beefs-up-cross-bordercooperation-in-blitz-on-fraud/1002023.article.
7

See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS., STRENGTHENING CAPITAL
MARKETS AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD iii (2005), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD192.pdf (hereinafter IOSCO, Financial Fraud).
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terms,8 significant differences exist in the manner such rules are enforced and the
remedies that are available.9 The United States, in particular, is viewed as having
one of the broadest prohibitions on securities fraud, in addition to having a relatively
accessible mechanism for private enforcement.10 For this reason, foreign investors
are increasingly seeking to initiate lawsuits in U.S. courts against alleged violators of
U.S. antifraud rules.11
A. Rule 10b-5: The Catch-All Antifraud Provision
One reason for the popularity of the U.S. antifraud regime among litigants is the
breadth of its most important antifraud provision, Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).12 This securities regulatory regime
seeks to prevent and punish fraud via numerous provisions in both the Securities Act
of 193313 and the Exchange Act. However, the most far-reaching of these provisions
is Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and its accompanying Rule 10b-5. The
Supreme Court has characterized Section 10(b) as a “catch-all” provision.14 It is not
restricted to fraud in connection with sales or transactions in the United States, but
rather applies to the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances “in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered,” so long as the means of
interstate commerce are implicated.15 Courts, in interpreting the language and
legislative history of Section 10(b), have determined that “Congress thus meant §
10(b) to protect against fraud in the sale or purchase of securities whether or not
these were traded on organized United States markets.”16
In 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) used its rule-making
authority under Section 10(b) to promulgate Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 makes it
unlawful:

8

Compare, for example, the prohibition in Rule 10b-5 to Trade Practices Act, 1974, c. 52
(Austl.) (prohibiting a corporation from engaging in conduct in trade or commerce that “is
misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive”).
9

See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Competition in the Private Enforcement of Regulatory
Law 2 (Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington Working Paper Series, 2008)
(available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129832) (hereinafter Buxbaum, Competition).
10
See id. at 1; see also Joshua G. Urquhart, Transnational Securities Fraud Regulation:
Problems and Solutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 473 (2000) (characterizing the US system as
the most “plaintiff-friendly”).
11

Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 16-17.

12

15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1951).
13

15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1934).

14

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).

15

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010) (emphasis added).

16

Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir. 1972).
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for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
a.
b.

c.

To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.17

The language of the rule is not only unquestionably far reaching, but also vague.
The details of its application and scope were left almost exclusively for the courts to
determine, generating extensive judicial discussion.18 With the increasing integration
of the world financial markets, one of the key questions with regards to Rule 10b-5,
in judicial, academic, and practitioner circles, has been the scope of its
extraterritorial application. The debate centers on the issue of how to properly
delineate this scope so as to prevent and punish fraud, without discouraging
companies from transacting in the United States or with U.S. persons, and without
causing conflict with other nations’ interests in regulating the activity.
B. Lawsuits Under the Antifraud Rules and “Foreign-Cubed” Cases
Rule 10b-5 has no explicit civil remedy for its violation, but an implied private
right of action has been well established for some time.19 In affirming the finding of
an implied private right of action under 10b-5, the Supreme Court has noted that
“private enforcement of Commission rules may ‘[provide] a necessary supplement to
Commission action’”20 in carrying out the purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Commentators have affirmed this position, noting that a private enforcement
mechanism provides a strong form of ex-post regulation that allows relatively lax exante regulation, a central characteristic of the U.S. securities regulatory system.21
The class action mechanism for lawsuits further strengthens the deterrent effect of
the private enforcement regime, combating the collective action problem presented

17

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).

18
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3477 (3rd ed. 2003)
(noting that “it is difficult to think of another instance in the entire corpus juris in which the
interaction of the legislative, administrative rulemaking, and judicial processes has produced
so much from so little,” and quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist who has called 10b-5 a “judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”).
19

Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196. It is also by now a common occurrence for class action
lawsuits to be brought under Rule 10b-5, and the SEC may also bring suit against violators for
the imposition of fines and/or injunctions.
20

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (quoting J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
21

Samuel Isaacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 380-82 (2007).
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by securities fraud perpetrated on widely dispersed shareholders.22 In contrast,
private litigation of securities fraud is less common in other countries, which rely
more heavily on government regulators to enforce their securities laws. However,
securities fraud litigation is catching on in other places, including Australia, Europe,
and China.23
In the context of globalized financial markets, securities fraud litigation in U.S.
courts raises complex questions about the extraterritorial application of securities
laws. It is very rare to find a modern securities fraud case that does not have an
international facet of some kind, be it a case against a foreign issuer whose shares are
traded on an American exchange,24 a suit against an American company who sells its
shares both in the United States and abroad,25 or a suit against a foreign company
who orchestrates a fraud in the United States, for example via its American
subsidiary.26 One particular genre of cases that has been presented with increasing
frequency is the so-called “foreign-cubed” cases.27 These cases involve (1) a foreign
investor who purchased the securities (2) of a foreign corporation (3) in a foreign
transaction.28 At first blush, these cases are predicated on transactions having little to
do with the United States, and it seems hardly surprising that courts would decline to
apply U.S. law to them. Certainly, they do present the outermost limit of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws. However, courts have recognized
that there are some instances in which these cases should be heard in the United
States, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part III, infra.
Evidence suggests that cases implicating the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities
laws are becoming increasingly common.29 A study of securities fraud class actions
22
Ilana T. Buschkin, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy –
Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal
Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1564-65 (2005).
23
See, e.g., Olivier Cavézian, et. al., Class Actions in Europe: Reality or Myth? The
Example of France, JONES DAY (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.jonesday.com/
files/Publication/ff7fd833-8640-443cbb46d6e756864345/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
6e60f00f-0d2a-4c0c-b986-d7982522c1f6/Class%20Actions%202009.pdf; Jonathan Redwood,
Limitations of U.S. Securities Litigation Against Australian Companies by Australian
Plaintiffs, LIST A BARRISTER PUBLICATIONS (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.
barristers.com.au/www/392/1001127/displayarticle/recent-publications1001461.html;
Chao
Xi, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Daqing Lianyi Co v. Zhong Weida and
Others (2004) Heilongjiang High Court, 1 J. COMP. L. 492 (2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965635.
24

See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).

25

See Mohanty v. Bigband Networks, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P94, 581 (2008).

26

See In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

27

Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 17.

28
See Stuart M. Grant & Diane Zilka, The Current Role of Foreign Investors in Federal
Securities Class Actions, 1620 PLI/CORP. 11 (2007). Grant and Zilka are generally credited
with coining the term “foreign-cubed.”
29
See, e.g., Brief of the Securities Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, in Response
to the Court’s Request at 4-5, Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008)
(No. 07-0583-CV) (hereinafter SEC Brief).
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found that they have generally been on the rise in recent years, particularly as a byproduct of the sub-prime crisis and the global financial crisis, with actions against
foreign issuers hitting an all-time high in 2008.30 This provides both a challenge and
an opportunity for examination of the still unsettled law on the extraterritorial
application of U.S. securities laws.
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD RULES
The Exchange Act is generally silent as to the extraterritorial application of its
antifraud provisions, except that Section 10(b) limits its reach to prohibited actions
using the “means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails.”31 Given
modern technology and the global nature of financial markets, this provision could
technically encompass a broad range of transactions having little or nothing to do
with the United States. However, the breadth of the antifraud provision is tempered
by a general presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law32 and
principles of international comity. Though it is clear that Congress, in its broad
wording of the antifraud provisions, intended some form of extraterritorial
application, it has left the task of outlining the scope of their extraterritorial
application to the courts.
A. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
Historically, application of regulatory laws was limited by the principle of
territoriality, as articulated in the Supreme Court’s famous American Banana case.33
However, the extraterritorial application of regulatory laws is now widely accepted,
though there remains a debate as to the proper scope and justifications for such
application.34 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, drawing on
principles of customary international law, provides some guidance as to the proper
extraterritorial reach of U.S. regulatory law. It defines jurisdiction to prescribe as the
power of a country to “make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of
persons, or the interests of persons in things.”35 The Restatement goes on to set forth
the following bases of jurisdiction: conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory; and conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
30
See, e.g., Grace Lamont & Patricia A. Etzold, 2008 Securities Litigation Study,
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS Apr. 1, 2009, http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20
SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF. It is important to note that class actions
are treated differently than other private actions or SEC enforcement actions in regard to the
question of the extraterritorial application of the securities laws.
31

15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010).

32

Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991). “It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.’” (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)).
33

Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).

34

See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883
(2002) (hereinafter Guzman, New Foundations).
35
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
Restatement 3rd).

OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987) (hereinafter
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have substantial effect within its territory.36 These two bases of jurisdiction are
reflected in the court-developed approaches known as the “conduct” and “effects”
tests, discussed below.
Even when one of the aforementioned bases for jurisdiction is minimally present,
the Restatement requires that the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.37
Drawing on the interest balancing approach of modern choice-of-law analysis, it sets
forth certain factors that should inform the reasonableness inquiry, such as the
relative interests of the States whose regulatory regimes are implicated, overall
contacts with the country seeking to exercise jurisdiction, and reasonable
expectations of the parties.38
With respect to U.S. securities laws in particular, the Restatement has more to
say, asserting that jurisdiction exists with regards to “conduct occurring
predominantly in the United States that is related to a transaction in securities, even
if the transaction takes place outside the United States.”39 This is a fairly broad
assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe, reflecting the policy articulated in the
Restatement that “an interest in punishing fraudulent or manipulative conduct is
entitled to greater weight than are routine administrative requirements.”40 However,
the extent of jurisdiction to prescribe under the Restatement is considered the outer
limit of the legislature’s extraterritorial reach, and courts have generally declined to
interpret Congress’ intent as having reached those outer limits in the context of U.S.
securities antifraud rules.41
The Restatement, like the judicially-developed “conduct” and “effects” tests,
reflects the need to balance a state’s regulatory interest against considerations of
international comity as well as an interest in preserving limited judicial resources.42
Principles of comity dictate that courts consider whether an exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction in a particular case will conflict with or infringe upon the regulatory
interests of another nation.43 Further, case law has recognized that, though a
36

Id.

37

Id. § 403.

38

Id. § 403(2)(a)-(h); see also, Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational
Litigation and Global Securities Class Actions Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 477 (2009).
39

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 416(1)(d) (1987).

40

Id. § 416 cmt. a (1987).

41

Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334.

42

The policies of avoiding jurisdictional conflict and preserving U.S. judicial resources
have been articulated frequently by the courts in cases addressing extraterritorial application of
the securities laws. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
However, it is worth noting that these considerations are also addressed by other tools of the
courts besides jurisdictional inquiries, such as discretionary dismissals on the bases of forum
non conveniens and comity. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 64-65.
43

The Supreme Court has articulated comity as “neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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regulatory interest may exist, if a transaction is “predominantly foreign,” the court
“must seek to determine whether Congress would have wished the precious
resources of the United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to
them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries.”44 These considerations
must be taken into account when courts consider whether an alleged fraud bears a
sufficient connection to the United States to warrant application of U.S. antifraud
rules.
B. The Conduct and Effects Tests
Because of its location at the center of the financial markets, the Second Circuit
has been the most influential court in terms of the development of jurisprudence in
this area. Though, other courts have sometimes deviated from the Second Circuit’s
approach.45 The Second Circuit has developed two tests to determine whether U.S.
securities laws should apply extraterritorially: the conduct test and the effects test.
Application of the antifraud rules may be found on the basis of either test, or on an
admixture of the two.46 The effects test focuses on whether U.S. investors or markets
were harmed by the alleged fraud. This will typically be the case, for example,
where a foreign company’s stock trades on a U.S. market.47 The key limitation to the
effects test is that courts do not consider foreign conduct with only generalized
effects in the United States to be sufficient.48 Rather, courts require a showing of
harm to specific interests within the United States.49
The conduct test looks at whether some conduct that was material to the alleged
fraud directly caused the harm in question, regardless of the location of the investors
or the markets where the stock was sold.50 The conduct test, while more soundly
rooted in the traditional basis of territoriality than the effects test, has proven to be
more difficult to apply than the effects test. The main difficulty is determining what
level of conduct in the U.S. is sufficient to warrant jurisdiction under the Exchange
Act. Securities transactions can be made up of many moving parts that often cross
territorial boundaries and fraudulent acts can occur in more than one place.51 The
Second Circuit addressed this question in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., asserting
44

Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985.

45

See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Law: An
Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-of-Law” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1812 (1992).
46

Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1995).

47

This was so in the first case to articulate the effects test. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
48

Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 22.

49

See id. at 22-3 (citing Interbrew S.A. v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
50

Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993 (asserting that U.S. securities laws apply to losses from sales of
securities to foreigners outside the United States only when acts or culpable failures to act
within the United States directly caused such losses).
51

See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 216-17 (1996).
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that U.S. securities laws only apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States when acts or culpable failures to act directly caused such
losses.52 Lesser thresholds of conduct are necessary when conduct causes losses in
the United States (no U.S. conduct is necessary), or to Americans residents abroad
(acts or omissions in the United States must have “significantly contributed” to such
losses).53 The Bersch standard relating to conduct causing losses to foreigners has
been further refined to hold that subject matter jurisdiction exists over securities
claims if “activities in [the United States] were more than merely preparatory to a
fraud and culpable acts or omissions occurring here directly caused losses to
investors abroad.”54 Of course, this still begs the questions of what is “merely
preparatory” and what constitutes “directly caused”; lower courts have struggled
with these questions, and the Second Circuit itself has provided little guidance.
C. A Procedural Note
Courts have always treated the question of extraterritorial application of the
securities antifraud provisions as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.55
However, this is somewhat of a misnomer as the real question is one of jurisdiction
to prescribe,56 or rather, whether or not the allegedly fraudulent acts fall within the
ambit of U.S. securities antifraud rules.57 The Supreme Court recently criticized the
“less-than-meticulous” treatment by courts of the distinction between an element of a
claim for relief under federal law and a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction.58 To
remedy this, the Supreme Court in Arbaugh v. T & H Corp.59 drew a bright-line rule
holding that “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”60
Even though the controversy before the Supreme Court was a Title VII claim, the
Court did not reserve its new bright-line rule to a particular context. Further, lower
courts have acknowledged that the rule from Arbaugh is applicable in the context of
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws.61
The jurisdictional limitation articulated by courts in these cases reflected a
“recognition by the courts that Congress would not have wished ‘the precious
resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies’ to be spent on
52
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predominantly foreign transactions.”62 While the recognition is valid, the question is
not one of subject matter jurisdiction of the courts. Instead, the Court’s statement in
Arbaugh clarifies that the inquiry should be one of a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief
under relevant provisions of the Exchange Act. Jurisdiction over lawsuits alleging
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is conferred by Section 27 of the
Exchange Act.63 The location of fraudulent conduct, therefore, does not affect this
conferral of jurisdiction. It is only relevant as to whether or not a particular
fraudulent scheme or act violates Section 10(b). Section 10(b) does not apply if no
use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce was made.64 Further,
courts have long recognized that the federal securities laws do not reach the outer
limit of Congress’ power to impose civil liabilities (which is constrained only by
constitutional due process considerations).65 Therefore, a fraudulent scheme must
have sufficient connection to the United States in order to be covered by the
substantive prohibitions of Section 10(b).66
There is an additional way in which the location of fraudulent acts in connection
with the sale or purchase of securities can be relevant. The private right of action for
Section 10(b) requires that a claim by a private plaintiff, as opposed to a suit brought
by the SEC, must allege a causal connection between their injury and the plaintiff’s
conduct.67 Therefore, where application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to a
particular fraudulent scheme is predicated solely on conduct within the United
States, foreign private plaintiffs could be required to show a causal connection
between the U.S. conduct and their alleged injuries.68 Such an approach would be in
keeping with the Supreme Court’s approach to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws.69 While making the distinction between a jurisdictional inquiry and a
failure-to-state-a-claim inquiry may have minimal impact on the outcome of most
cases, it does make clear the distinction between the standard that must be met by
private plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit versus the standard that must be met by the
SEC in an enforcement action.70 In cases involving parallel claims by foreign private
litigants and the SEC, this distinction is important, as courts using the subject matter
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jurisdiction inquiry have historically dismissed both actions if they find an
insufficient connection between the U.S. conduct and the alleged harm.71
IV. THE CONDUCT TEST IN FOCUS: FOREIGN-CUBED CASES AND THE PROBLEMS OF
UNDER AND OVERREGULATION
The conduct test has been applied frequently in recent years. With the increasing
incidence of transnational securities fraud, investors have become more proactive in
seeking redress. Often this leads them to the United States, with its well-developed
class action mechanism in securities fraud cases.72 Courts have begun to hear socalled foreign-cubed cases with increasing frequency.73 Such cases test the outer
limits of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules on the basis of the
conduct test, and also highlight the problems with the current approach of courts
with respect to this issue.
A. Morrison v. National Australia Bank
A recent foreign-cubed case decided by the Second Circuit underscored the
particular difficulties raised by this kind of case and reignited debate on the proper
scope of the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws on the basis of conduct. The
impetus for Morrison v. National Australia Bank was a series of write-downs made
by National Australia Bank (“NAB”) in 2001, due to the allegedly fraudulent
overvaluation of one of NAB’s American subsidiaries, HomeSide, Inc., a Floridabased mortgage servicing company.74 The write-downs totaled approximately $4
billion.75 It constituted the largest loss reported in Australian corporate history up to
that point.76 NAB’s shares, trading on the Australian Stock Exchange, as well as on
exchanges in Tokyo, New Zealand, London, and in the form of American Depositary
Receipts (“ADRs”) on the New York Stock Exchange, initially dropped between
10% and 13% following the write-downs.77
In response to these losses, a group of international shareholders of the bank
brought a lawsuit against NAB in U.S. federal court, claiming violations of the
securities antifraud rules including Rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs alleged that the
71

See generally, e.g., Morrison, 547 F.3d 167.
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See PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2008 Securities Litigation Study, April 1, 2009,
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL
.PDF (noting that securities class actions against foreign issuers hit an all-time high in 2008).
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overvaluation of HomeSide was the result of intentional misuse of valuation models
by certain NAB employees and executives who “had been cooking HomeSide’s
books since at least April 1999,” in violation of the U.S. securities laws.78 These
misstatements of HomeSide’s value were sent to NAB’s headquarters in Australia
and incorporated into its consolidated financial statements, then disseminated to the
public in regulatory filings and press releases, including filings with the SEC made
in connection with NAB’s ADRs.79
Although calling the case a “close call,” the District Court dismissed the case,
stating that “the transactions of which the plaintiffs complain [are] fundamentally
foreign in nature, and thus beyond the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction under the
Exchange Act.”80 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
outcome.81 However, the Second Circuit left open the possibility that, on other facts,
it would hear a foreign-cubed claim by foreign plaintiffs.82 Defendants had argued
for a bright-line rule barring foreign-cubed claims brought solely on the basis of
conduct in the United States, if there was no allegation of harm to domestic investors
or markets.83 The Second Circuit refused to adopt such a rule, because it could not
anticipate “all the circumstances in which the ingenuity of those inclined to violate
the securities laws should result in their being subject to American jurisdiction.”84
Instead, the Second Circuit determined that the conduct and effects tests were the
proper lens through which to examine the question of extraterritoriality.85 It went on
to say that the issue before it in Morrison “boils down to what conduct comprises the
heart of the alleged fraud.”86 On the facts of the case, though, the Second Circuit
found that acts or omissions in Australia were “more directly responsible” for the
plaintiffs’ injuries, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case.87
Morrison was the Second Circuit’s first look at a foreign-cubed case, and
although it did not find a sufficient basis for the application of U.S. securities laws,
numerous district court decisions have come out the other way. For example, In re
Gaming Lottery involved claims by both U.S. and foreign plaintiffs against a
Canadian corporation for fraud in connection with the sale of securities on both
American and Canadian exchanges.88 The relevant U.S. conduct included the
acquisition of a Washington corporation which the defendant company proceeded to
operate without receiving regulatory approval from Washington State gaming
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regulators for operations.89 In addition, the company reported increases in earnings
and stockholder equity based on the acquired entity’s financials, even though they
knew they would not be able to obtain regulatory approval for the entity’s
operations, therefore making the statements regarding the U.S. subsidiary’s earnings
misleading.90 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York certified both Canadians and U.S. investors as lead plaintiffs,91 finding that
sufficient conduct had occurred in the United States that was “more than merely
preparatory” to the alleged fraud so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims of both Canadian and domestic plaintiffs.92
Similarly, in In re Vivendi Universal, the issuing company’s Chief Executive
Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) moved to New York in order
to oversee a number of acquisitions of U.S. companies. It was debt taken on in
connection with these acquisitions that was the focus of the allegedly false and
misleading statements at issue in the lawsuit.93 The U.S.-based conduct was,
therefore, the basis for the false statements, and was found to be “integral and not
merely preparatory to the alleged fraud upon foreign purchasers of Vivendi shares on
foreign exchanges.”94
Comparing the facts of these cases to Morrison, it seems clear that Morrison
could have easily come out the other way.95 Indeed, the judge in In re Gaming
Lottery might well have found for plaintiffs in Morrison. Although the Second
Circuit claimed to be applying its “usual rules,”96 the court struggled with the issue
of whether the conduct in the U.S. had “directly caused” the harm abroad. The
Second Circuit used novel language to find that acts or omissions in Australia were
“more directly responsible” for the plaintiffs’ injuries.97 This simple addition of the
word “more” had the effect of changing the inquiry to a question of which acts, on
balance, more directly caused the alleged fraud. Under the usual articulation of the
test, it is quite possible that conduct in more than one place could directly cause the
alleged harm. Certainly, the Restatement and customary international law both
contemplate concurrent jurisdiction in some circumstances.98 The Second Circuit’s
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“more directly” language had never appeared in any prior case, making it seem like
the Court was straining to avoid exercising jurisdiction in this case.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit never said that the actions taken in the U.S. were
not directly responsible for the losses to investors abroad, but only that the actions in
Australia were a more direct cause, essentially introducing a balancing test into the
analysis where none had previously existed. Such a balancing approach is
reminiscent of the approach taken by the Restatement, even though courts and
commentators have generally eschewed the utility of a conflict-of-laws style interestbalancing approach to these cases.99 Furthermore, just because the activity abroad
may have more directly caused the harm in a particular case, it should not necessarily
dictate that a U.S. court has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Such an outcome could
violate the spirit of U.S. securities laws and could leave defrauded investors without
a remedy, even in cases where arguably grievous acts of fraud had occurred in the
United States.
B. The Problems of Under and Overregulation
As the Second Circuit’s decision in Morrison highlights, one of the key problems
with the conduct test is that it is difficult to apply to modern securities fraud cases.
Because of the case-by-case nature of the inquiry and the lack of uniformity among
courts in interpreting the conduct test, cases with similar facts will often have
disparate outcomes, without any clear indicators from courts as to what tips the
balance one way or the other. In fact, rather than seeking to provide a clear set or
hierarchy of factors, courts have cautioned against relying on any particular factor as
a sufficient decisional guide.100 One reason for retaining a flexible test and shunning
bright-line rules is to avoid providing a roadmap to fraud for opportunistic issuers.
In fact, a concern expressed by the plaintiffs and the SEC as amicus curiae in the
Morrison case was that the court’s holding could “render superfluous the conduct
test, in effect converting it into a ‘from where the misstatements originated and
emanated’ test.”101 Such a standard could make it easier for foreign entities to
structure transactions specifically to avoid application of the U.S. antifraud rules
while still benefiting from the fraudulent conduct of their U.S. subsidiaries.102
Foreign issuers may in fact be doing so already. A practice note written by an
Australian law firm following the Morrison decision advises issuer clients that they
can limit exposure to U.S. litigation by “taking steps to ensure that . . . the issuance
of [their] disclosures” occurs outside the United States.103
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Apart from providing a roadmap to fraud for opportunistic issuers, too narrow an
approach to extraterritoriality could result in under regulation, if no country has a
sufficient basis or motivation for applying their law to a case. For example, an
approach such as that used by the Morrison court that would apply U.S. law only
where U.S. conduct comprises “the heart” of the fraud, could frequently result in
instances where no law applies, as conduct may not predominate in any single
jurisdiction. This kind of anarchy in terms of antifraud enforcement could negatively
impact investor confidence in the securities markets.
In a world where fraud is not sufficiently deterred, or where adequate remedies
are not available to defrauded investors, investor confidence in the integrity of
securities markets will be compromised.104 This can have a negative effect on
liquidity and prices in markets around the world.105 Recent decades have seen a
dramatic increase in the integration and interdependence of world financial markets.
Generally speaking, globalization along these lines is viewed as a positive thing,
generating economic growth around the world. However the “flip side . . . is the
problem of financial crises—the problem of lending booms and busts, massive
capital inflows and equally massive reversals.”106 A second aspect of this increasing
integration of the world’s financial markets is the global nature of modern securities
fraud. For example, the revelation of the multi-billion-dollar international ponzi
scheme run by Bernard Madoff epitomizes the truly global reach of modern
securities fraud: from his base in New York, Madoff sold his scheme to investors on
nearly every continent. Victims ranged from the major Spanish bank Santander to a
Korean pension fund to a synagogue in New York to the International Olympic
Committee.107 Fraud such as this can and does negatively impact investor
confidence, slowing investment flows around the world.108
All of this complicates the work of financial regulators, who must seek to
regulate the increasingly complex and integrated securities markets and prevent
fraud that stretches across borders, without overstepping the traditionally territorial
mandate of regulatory law, and without over-regulating, which causes costly
inefficiencies. In the words of one SEC commissioner:
Our mission to facilitate capital formation extends not just to companies
headquartered in the United States, but to those from outside the country
as well . . . . We must be careful to balance the costs versus benefits of our
regulations—we must maintain the integrity of our markets so that
investors have confidence that they will be treated fairly, but we also must
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not price those very investors out of our markets through burdensome
regulations.109
The work of U.S. regulators is further complicated by the fact that the SEC is, in the
words of one commentator, “overworked and understaffed.”110 Therefore, the SEC is
not able to proactively regulate corporate behavior so as to deter fraudulent activity,
and, instead, must rely on private enforcement mechanisms.
In the aftermath of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the revelation of recent
securities fraud scandals, a consensus has emerged that the SEC and other regulators
have failed to properly maintain the balance between the costs and benefits of its
regulations. The resulting loss of confidence in financial regulators extends
internationally as well. In early 2009, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”) issued a report on the global economic crisis citing a
number of “systemic factors” that contributed to the crisis, including “the fullfledged deregulation of financial markets and the increased sophistication of
speculation techniques and financial engineering.”111
On the flip side, an open-ended approach creates uncertainty for issuers regarding
potential liability under U.S. antifraud rules. This may have a chilling effect on
valuable economic activity in the United States, as foreign companies limit their
business within the United States in order to avoid the risk of having to defend
against costly litigation in U.S. courts.112 For example, if the Morrison case had
came out the other way, it could have potentially discourage foreign companies from
investing in U.S. subsidiaries. Furthermore, as multiple countries can often claim a
legitimate regulatory interest in regulating the same conduct, the cost of multiple
regulations becomes burdensome to businesses. Concurrent jurisdiction may not
always be a problem, but when multiple countries are able to assert their regulatory
jurisdiction over conduct because of effects on their citizens, and one or more other
countries are also able to apply their laws and regulations because of conduct within
their borders, the cost of compliance with all these rules can become prohibitive. For
example, in a recent alleged fraud by the French media company Vivendi Universal,
S.A., French regulatory authorities carried out a criminal investigation into the
scandal.113 At the same time, the company was sued in U.S. federal court under Rule
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10b-5 by both European and U.S. investors. It is also becoming increasingly costly
for regulators and judicial systems to enforce the law, as more and more transactions
can implicate a country’s regulatory system on the basis of tenuous contacts with that
country.114
In addition to potential over-regulation, too broad of an extraterritorial
application of the U.S. antifraud rules could result in jurisdictional conflict with
other countries seeking to regulate the same transaction. Because of variations in the
intensity of enforcement and the remedies available, investors may forum-shop to
find the most favorable forum in which to bring their suit.115 Countries that have
made the regulatory judgment to provide less investor protection could, therefore,
have their legislative judgment thwarted.116 In other contexts, such as antitrust, broad
assertions of extraterritorial application of U.S. laws has raised diplomatic protests.117
While the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules has not yet caused
significant clashes with other countries, some commentators fear that it is only a
matter of time.118
V. STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE: PROSPECTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
Given the recent increase in foreign-cubed claims in U.S. courts, and cases such
as Morrison, the time is ripe to re-examine the conduct test and the problems it
presents. There is considerable fragmentation among courts on how to apply the
conduct test to claims of transnational securities fraud, and courts have struggled to
find the proper balance among the competing interests at issue.119 However, in spite
of the imperfections of the current approach taken by courts to address the question
of extraterritoriality, reform is a thorny issue. Although broad assertions of
extraterritoriality risk cause jurisdictional conflict and overregulation,120 too narrow
of an approach to extraterritoriality will make it easier for opportunistic issuers to
structure transactions specifically to avoid application of U.S. antifraud rules, and
may result in under-regulation.
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A. A Market-Based Approach?
To address the problems presented by transnational securities fraud, a number of
commentators have suggested limiting the extraterritorial reach of securities laws.
Apart from the bright-line rule urged by the defendants in Morrison, some legal
scholars have argued that there should be an exchange-based choice-of-law rule. In
other words, if foreign investors transacted in foreign securities on a non-U.S.
exchange, they would be barred from bringing a Rule 10b-5 claim in U.S. courts
against the foreign issuer.121 This approach focuses on the effects of an alleged
fraud, and would result in discarding the conduct test altogether. It takes the view
that governments should only be concerned about regulating conduct that has effects
on persons within their jurisdiction.122 The best way to maximize global welfare, on
this view, is to rely on the securities market to select the optimal level of
regulation.123
Thus, an exchange-based rule would provide a number of benefits. First, it
would provide issuers with valuable certainty as to the applicable law. Such
certainty would reduce the costs associated with offering securities and, therefore,
allow the securities to be sold at a better price to investors. Second, this approach
would theoretically lead to a socially optimal level of regulation.124 If issuers choose
to offer their securities on exchanges where investors perceive they would not
receive adequate protection, investors will offer less for the securities than the issuer
could obtain on an exchange associated with more investor-friendly rules.
Conversely, under regimes where the marginal cost of additional regulations would
outweigh the marginal benefits of the higher price investors might be willing to pay,
issuers will not choose to sell there.125
In the context of fraud in modern securities markets, there are three key problems
with this approach. The first problem is that this approach ignores the
interconnectedness of the financial markets and the resulting interest of governments
in punishing fraud regardless of who is directly harmed. Fraud in one place can have
a chilling effect on markets worldwide, and even investors and markets not directly
affected by a fraud can be harmed indirectly by fraudulent activity elsewhere.126
This means that the U.S. and other countries have a strong interest in deterring fraud
regardless of where the effects are felt. Excluding foreign claimants from bringing
securities fraud lawsuits in the United States or from participating in class actions in
the United States undermines the deterrent effect of the private cause of action under
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Rule 10b-5.127 The benefits of the private cause of action, and the class action
lawsuit in particular, are not available in most other countries that “lack private
procedural instruments which can generate rigorous substantive control.”128
A second problem with the market-based approach to fraud regulation is that it
ignores other factors influencing the choice of law, or, as here, the selection of a
market. In practice there are many factors besides antifraud protections that dictate
where people invest and where issuers choose to sell their securities, including tax
considerations, expertise of regulators, reporting requirements, and even simple
geography. All other things being equal, the law and economics approach to
antifraud regulation might be a good one, but unfortunately, all other things are not
equal.129 Therefore, market selection may not lead to the optimal level of antifraud
protection. A market-based approach may in fact lead to a regulatory “race to the
bottom.”130 Related to this is the law-and-economics assumption of the rational
investor, which holds that investors price the potential for fraud into the securities
they purchase. An alternative model of investor behavior, the so-called “trusting
investor” model,131 argues that investors “are willing to lose fair and square but not to
be taken by fraud.”132 After they are defrauded, investors lose trust in securities
markets, leading to price declines and potentially prolonging a bear market.133 While
it is unclear which view of investor behavior more closely corresponds with reality,
there is at least some evidence that a significant number of investors better fit the
“trusting investor” model.134 This evidence against the rational investor model,
combined with the potential for a regulatory race-to-the-bottom, cautions against
letting the markets decide the appropriate level of antifraud regulation.
Third, for the market-based approach to act as a stand-in for U.S. regulatory law
when it comes to protecting defrauded U.S. investors, one must assume that all other
countries with a stock exchange have an adequate antifraud enforcement regime.
Such an assumption may be true with respect to some countries but certainly not all
of them. Even financially developed countries such as Germany have recently been
reexamining their securities enforcement system following large corporate
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scandals.135 The SEC has argued against such an approach, fearing it would let too
much fraud slip through the cracks.136
A modification of the exchange-based rule that potentially addresses the last of
these problems, the one involving inadequate enforcement in other countries, has
been proposed by Professors Choi and Silberman.137 They have argued for an
exchange-based jurisdictional presumption, which would be rebuttable ex-ante by a
determination by the SEC that certain countries lack effective antifraud rules and,
therefore, U.S. law should be applied to claims of investors trading in those certain
countries.138 This proposal is effectively a market-based approach, giving certainty
as to the applicable law, at least for transactions taking place on a market that the
SEC considers to be adequately regulated. It would also address the third of the
criticisms of a pure market-based approach outlined above, that some countries may
not have an adequate antifraud enforcement regime. As such, this market-based
presumption approach would be a better solution than the pure exchange-based rule.
However, it would not address the other two problems with an exchange-based rule
discussed above. In addition, the SEC “blacklist” contemplated by this proposal may
be problematic, as it is unlikely in the current climate that the SEC would consider
the antifraud enforcement systems of other countries up to par.
A final point with regards to any proposed reform aimed at limiting
extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules is that narrowing the extraterritorial
scope of U.S. law would not address the problem of jurisdictional conflict caused by
transnational securities fraud generally. Although it would limit criticisms by other
countries of the United States’ approach to extraterritorial application of its laws, the
overall problem of a transaction being subject to multiple regulatory systems would
not go away.139 Other actors around the world are catching on to the fact that there
may be something to be gained in helping allegedly defrauded investors seek
redress.140 Even if the U.S. cedes its position as the most plaintiff-friendly forum for
adjudicating transnational securities fraud claims, it is only a matter of time before
another country’s system steps in to fill that role.141
While there is merit to the argument that the United States cannot police the
world for securities fraud,142 there is a clear U.S. interest in allowing at least some
foreign claimants to bring suit in U.S. courts and/or to participate in class actions.
As one commentator points out, if multinational corporations believe they can
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engage in fraud with little consequence over large portions of the globe, they will
either:
[a]dopt a two-tiered system, in which U.S. customers are treated
differently from foreign customers, or corporations continue to injure both
U.S. and foreign purchasers alike, calculating that profits gained from
abroad more than make up for the court fees and damages that must be
paid out to U.S. purchasers.143
And, the United States has an interest in preventing both of these scenarios to protect
its securities markets and investors. The United States has long recognized that
allowing fraudulent activity within its borders, even if the harm is only to foreigners,
is contrary to its public policy.144
B. The Case for a Multilateral Resolution
Another potential solution to the jurisdictional problems raised by transnational
securities fraud would be a multilateral negotiated solution.145 As noted in a recent
report by the International Bar Association (“IBA”), “[t]here is a profound consensus
among regulators, academics, financial institutions and others that the regulatory
framework of the international financial markets needs to undergo a fundamental
change to address the diminished influence of national and regional securities
regulators over cross-border financial activities.”146 This consensus applies to all
areas of financial regulation.147 However, it is particularly present in the context of
deterring and punishing securities fraud, which is necessary to maintain the stability
and prosperity in the capital markets.
Transnational securities fraud provides an ideal backdrop for international
cooperation. First of all, the problems caused by securities fraud—lack of investor
confidence, reduced liquidity in the markets, and depressed prices—are no longer
contained to one country or region but will affect capital markets throughout the
world.148 Furthermore, most countries with a securities market have regulations
aimed at discouraging financial fraud.149 While the prohibitions on fraud vary in
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form, in substance they all aim to eradicate essentially the same behavior.150
Similarly, all countries with an active securities market have an interest in reducing
the inefficiencies created by overregulation and jurisdictional conflict. In the wake
of the recent financial crisis, there is an even greater consensus among countries that
cooperation and reform are needed in the area of financial regulation.151 Therefore,
the current climate presents a significant opportunity for the relevant actors to pursue
a multilateral solution to the problems presented by transnational securities fraud.
So far, the main efforts at cooperation and coordination in enforcing antifraud
rules have focused on implementing minimum international standards and providing
for cooperation in cross-border enforcement.152 The International Organization of
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) has been working for some time on promoting
cooperation among the world’s securities regulators to create guidelines and
facilitate cross-border enforcement.153 However, IOSCO has had only limited
success in furthering the much needed rapprochement between regulatory systems.154
Over the years, IOSCO’s role has mainly consisted of information sharing and
collecting, and making recommendations of non-binding guidelines for regulators.155
In 2002, the organization adopted a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
(“MMOU”) “designed to facilitate cross-border enforcement and exchange of
information among the international community of securities regulators.”156 The
MMOU sets forth a framework for information sharing between members, including
the type of information obtainable, procedures for requesting such information, and
authorized uses for the information.157 As of this writing, the MMOU has sixty-four
signatories from among the world’s securities regulators, including the SEC and the
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.158 However, the MMOU is nonRISK OF FRAUD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 11 (2008), http://www.acfe.com/documents/managingbusiness-risk.pdf.
150
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binding, and significant legal barriers to its implementation still exist in many
countries.159 In addition, while information sharing is helpful, it does not solve the
problems that arise when multiple countries seek to apply their laws to the same
activity. Nor does it solve the problems of inadequate enforcement. Recent IOSCO
assessment reports have found that many countries “face significant challenges in
implementing credible and effective enforcement programs.”160 Given the limited
success of IOSCO and other voluntary efforts thus far, as well as the urgency of
addressing the issues raised by transnational securities fraud, it is clear that another
approach is in order.
Recognizing that abolishing national regulations in favor of a comprehensive set
of international regulations is neither very feasible nor the most favorable approach,
the IBA Report calls for synchronization of existing national and regional
regulations.161 Such synchronization can come about through convergence or
standardization, exemption, or recognition.162
These approaches, or some
combination thereof, are already being employed by some countries. For example,
harmonization of minimum standards in combination with mutual recognition lies at
the heart of the European Union (“EU”) “passport” system of securities regulation
between EU member states.163 Similarly, many countries are entering into mutual
recognition agreements such as the U.S.-Australia Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to
the Enforcement of Securities Laws (“U.S.-Australia MOU”).164 Some combination
of these same approaches—harmonization, exemption, and recognition—could help
resolve the problems raised by transnational securities fraud.
Advocates of an exchange-based choice of law rule favor the market-based
approach because it would avoid jurisdictional conflict and reduce costly
inefficiencies.165 In a similar vein, the IBA urges governments to “agree upon a
framework that provides for one jurisdiction to be the appropriate jurisdiction in
which enforcement action will be taken in relation to any particular misconduct.”166
The aim would be to create a form of cross-jurisdictional rule against double
jeopardy,167 thus avoiding conflicts between jurisdictions who disagree as to the
proper form or intensity of regulation of certain conduct, and limiting costs
associated with the inefficiencies caused by overregulation. However, rather than
159
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U.S. courts adopting a unilateral exchange-based choice of law rule, a similar result
could be achieved while still ensuring adequate protection of investors and the
markets, through a multilateral mutual recognition system.
First, some level of harmonization of the standard for what constitutes prohibited
fraud may be necessary. Then, countries could adopt a mutual recognition system
similar to that in place between EU member states. Mutual recognition essentially
requires “that each country recognize the adequacy of the rules and regulations of
another country,” thus permitting a regulated entity to do business in both
jurisdictions.168 A similar multilateral agreement could be negotiated between a
broader number of jurisdictions, under which the parties would recognize the
adequacy of each other’s antifraud regimes. Rather than simply providing minimum
standards, such as the current IOSCO principles,169 the mutual recognition system
would provide a stronger incentive for countries with inadequate enforcement
systems to strengthen their regulatory regimes. Some countries would undoubtedly
need to update their antifraud rules or enforcement systems before other nations
would be willing to admit them to the mutual recognition framework. Because of the
obvious benefit to businesses of such an arrangement, national governments would
have a strong incentive to ensure their regulatory systems were up to par and to
undertake any necessary reforms. IOSCO could perhaps serve as a central overseer
of the system, ensuring that a country’s regulatory system met certain minimum
standards in terms of substance and enforcement capability before it would be
admitted to the mutual recognition agreement. The arrangement should also include
technical and capacity building assistance for emerging markets to strengthen their
regulatory capability.170
A choice-of-law framework would accompany the mutual recognition system for
determining which nation’s law would apply to a particular transaction. The
framework would be applicable both in the context of a public enforcement action
and in private lawsuits. Determining the proper jurisdiction could be done in a
number of ways. The agreement could provide that the primary trading market of a
company’s securities would be the proper jurisdiction.171 Alternatively, the
jurisdiction of incorporation of the issuer could be the presumptive jurisdiction for
enforcement. There is some precedent on which to base such a jurisdictional
arrangement. For example, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has
overseen the drafting of a number of conventions that are jurisdictional in nature.
The far-reaching Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters is one such framework, though negotiations on this broad
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agreement have stalled, and parties have struggled to reach consensus.172 Similarly,
the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of
Securities Held with an Intermediary could be used as a model for the jurisdictional
agreement.173
Of course, adopting a system such as the one outlined above would not be
without difficulty. Governments will undoubtedly be reluctant to participate in an
agreement which they perceive as forcing them to cede regulatory authority over
securities fraud activity. To mitigate this concern, rather than creating a strict rule
under which only one country would have jurisdiction over a particular instance of
fraud, the agreement could perhaps contemplate a hierarchy of regulatory authority.
Under such a hierarchy one state would have presumptive priority over particular
conduct. Further, under certain circumstances that would be enumerated in the
agreement another country could, however, apply its law to the activity instead.
Such an approach is not unprecedented in international law. For example, under the
UN Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
arguably one of the most successful international treaties dealing with jurisdictional
considerations, authority to set aside an arbitral award is only granted to the courts of
the country where the award was rendered, except in certain enumerated
circumstances.174
In addition to the standardization-and-mutual-recognition approach outlined
above, bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements could be a complementary
tool for furthering a multilateral solution to the problem of transnational securities
fraud. Cooperation agreements, including the U.S.-Australia MOU mentioned
above, and others such as a Multilateral Memorandum on the Exchange of
Information and on the Surveillance of Securities Activities between the members of
the Forum of European Securities Commissions,175 are already in place. Though,
they vary in the level of cooperation promised and their enforceability.176 These
172
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agreements help regulators to collect information they would not otherwise be able
to obtain in some instances of transnational fraud, easing the way for enforcement.
The multilateral solution proposed above is not the only way in which countries
could work together to address the problems posed by the increasing instance of
transnational securities fraud. However, governments should prioritize international
cooperation in this arena. Recent events in the global financial markets, as well as
contentious cases such as Morrison that raise important jurisdictional considerations
in adjudicating transnational securities fraud claims, present an opportunity for
catalyzing cooperation that should be seized. Any multilateral solution should
address both increased cooperation in terms of information sharing and enforcement,
but negotiators should also consider a framework that would limit the instances
where multiple nations would seek to regulate the same activity,177 while still
ensuring that transnational frauds do not go unpunished.
VI. CONCLUSION
Transnational securities fraud has increased the costs and complicated national
securities regulator’s enforcement work. It also creates potential for underenforcement, as no one country may have sufficient incentives to enforce its
antifraud rules against an international violator. This situation underscores the need
for a private enforcement mechanism for investors to seek redress, preferably all
together and in one forum in order to reduce inefficiencies. Uncertainty as to the
applicable law and potential overregulation when multiple jurisdictions seek to
impose penalties for the same fraudulent activity cause costly inefficiencies in the
market. It is also unsustainable for the United States to act as the international
policeman for securities fraud. In addition, an overly broad extraterritorial
application of national regulatory law may cause jurisdictional conflict with other
countries.
A market-based rule or presumption, as suggested by some
commentators, would help resolve the problems of overregulation and jurisdictional
conflict. However, such a rule could result in under-regulation, which comes with
its own costs in terms of reduced investor confidence in the markets. Ideally, a
multilateral solution should be negotiated that would encourage countries to meet
certain minimum standards in terms of substance and enforcement of securities
antifraud rules, while at the same time providing a jurisdictional or choice-of-law
agreement to determine a primary enforcement jurisdiction.
The Morrison case has drawn renewed attention to the U.S. courts’ approach to
dealing with transnational securities fraud, and underscores the need for reform.178
The dispute on the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities antifraud rules
though Bahrain requires legislative approval and MOUs were not approved by the legislature.
MOU status of enforceability is not affected by non-registration or late-registration.
Therefore, Bahrain, was precluded from arguing that Qatar did not think MOU was an
international agreement because they did not register it until six months after the signing.).
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among courts, academics, and other actors should motivate the U.S. government to
initiate multilateral discussion of the issue. Though, a multilateral negotiated
solution will take some time to achieve. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Morrison case.179 As this author expected, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second
Circuit’s decision.180 The Supreme Court grounded its decision on the fact that the
§10(b) did not apply extraterritorily and thus only applied to securities on domestic
exchanges.181 Accordingly, there was no claim as the securities involved were no
listed on a domestic exchange.182 As discussed in Part I(b) supra, the private
enforcement mechanism in the United States is important to ensuring the securities
laws are adequately enforced.183 In addition, there are a number of other
considerations that weigh in favor of preserving a flexible approach to the question
of extraterritorial application of the antifraud rules.
Some commentators have argued that courts should adopt a presumption in favor
of extraterritoriality, urging that “reasonable” extraterritorial assertions of U.S.
regulatory law will encourage international cooperation and lead to more bilateral
and multilateral agreements to resolve conflicts and improve global regulation.184 It
is difficult to prove that U.S. courts’ approach to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities laws has caused the movement towards increased bilateral
cooperation. However, it is clear that bilateral cooperation has not been stunted.
There has also been greater multilateral cooperation in recent years, for example, in
the form of the multilateral memorandum of understanding adopted by the
179
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International Organization of Securities Commissions in 2002.185 Such activity has
coincided with the increasing internationalization of the world’s financial markets as
well as increased incidence of securities fraud claims in U.S. courts by foreign
plaintiffs.
A presumption in favor of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules,
of course, is victim to the various criticisms that have been made by proponents of a
market-based rule. It is more likely to lead to overregulation, thus creating economic
inefficiencies. In addition, broader extraterritorial application will more likely lead
to jurisdictional conflict. However, the criticisms of this approach may be
outweighed by its benefits. There is little evidence that fear of extraterritorial
assertions of the antifraud rules have caused foreign companies to avoid conducting
business in the United States.186 Although U.S. equity markets may no longer be the
markets of choice for the world’s corporations, there are many factors that have
contributed to this, and the blame cannot all be laid on overregulation or shareholder
lawsuits.187
Further, the problem of jurisdictional conflict is less acute in the realm of
securities law than in other areas such as antitrust.188 As noted above, securities fraud
is almost universally prohibited. The substance of the law is also fairly similar
across the world.189 While procedural and enforcement mechanisms differ, private
enforcement in general is becoming more universally accepted. For example, China
has recently opened the way for civil disputes relating to securities fraud.190 Even the
French government has recently stated that it is not opposed to the idea of class
actions cases in France for investor redress, though no reform to this effect has yet
made much headway.191 All this signals increasing acceptance of the U.S. approach
185
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to enforcement of its securities laws. It may even open the way for competition
between jurisdictions for private regulatory claims.192
In sum, as private enforcement catches on, and regulators around the world
recognize the need for greater cooperation and improved enforcement of securities
antifraud rules, the time is ripe for governments and other interested parties to begin
work on a multilateral negotiated solution to the problems presented by transnational
securities fraud. In the meantime, U.S. courts should be careful to preserve a flexible
approach to the question of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules,
while still screening out claims by foreign plaintiffs that are not based on sufficient
conduct within the United States. More aggressive use of discretionary dismissals on
the base of international comity or forum non conveniens may be useful in this
regard.193
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